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Norchem Drug Testing:  
A Small Company’s Lean Journey 
This case was prepared by Joe Anderson and Susan Williams and is intended to be used as a basis 
for class discussion. The views presented here are those of the authors based on their professional 
judgment. The name of the supplier firm, U. S. Plastics (USP) has been disguised to preserve 
anonymity. 
 
It was December and the end of the year 2010 was approaching. Bill Gibbs, CEO of Norchem Drug 
Testing in Flagstaff, Arizona, was reflecting on the past and projecting forward into his company’s future.  
He clearly recalled his reflections almost exactly a decade ago. At that time, Norchem’s competitors had 
cut prices for drugs of abuse (DOA) tests. A test that had been $15 had become $6.50. At the time, Gibbs 
had wondered how in the world he would be able to help Norchem survive with margins “falling like a 
bowling ball off a cliff.”  Yet, over the last ten years, the company had survived and even thrived, thanks 
to its persistent application of lean thinking to all critical dimensions of the business. 
 
Now, Norchem’s competitive environment was changing again. The recession had contracted demand for 
their services. After sustained growth in revenues averaging 28% per year over the previous decade, 2009 
revenue was down 9% from 2008.  In addition, large national labs were beginning to acquire smaller, 
specialized, DOA testing labs. In effect these larger companies that had previously focused on the broader 
market like employment testing were becoming direct competitors of Norchem.  Further, changes in 
technology were beginning to be felt in Norchem’s niche. On-site testing kits had become cheaper and 
more accurate, allowing Norchem’s clients to perform preliminary testing on-site and only use Norchem’s 
services when their samples tested positive for the presence of drugs. Finally, Norchem was discovering 
issues in their relationships with suppliers. Some friction had emerged as they tried to extend lean processes 
outside their small enterprise, interacting with less lean suppliers that significantly outsized Norchem. All 
these factors figured large in Gibbs’ thinking. Would lean thinking and lean processes be enough to 
overcome the current challenges and insure Norchem’s survival and prosperity this time around?   
Company Overview 
Norchem Drug Testing, located in Flagstaff, Arizona, tested for the presence and identification of drugs 
of abuse in human specimens.  This forensic toxicology laboratory provided screening and confirmation 
testing with results that were legally defensible in court.  Norchem primarily served criminal justice 
clients such as law enforcement, social welfare agencies, and probation and parole agencies.  Tests were 
to determine the presence of commonly-abused drugs, predominantly in urine specimens though some 
tests were also available for saliva specimens.  Clients ordered customized panels selecting among tests 
for the presence of over 40 drugs including stimulants, opiates, narcotics, sedatives, and the relative 
newcomer SPICE.  Sophisticated instrumentation such as Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry 
(GC/MS) and Liquid Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry/Mass Spectrometry (LC/MS/MS) was used.   
In 2009, Norchem employed approximately 72 people and had revenues of $8.98 million. 
  
Forensic Drug Testing: Niche in the Diagnostic Testing Industry 
In the U.S., lab-based testing services generated revenues of $52 billion in 2008.  DOA testing accounted 
for 3% of total lab-based testing services.  The majority of this testing was performed in hospital labs.  
Approximately 35% of the testing was performed by independent labs with the three largest labs serving 
27% of that market (Quest Diagnostics, LabCorp, and MEDTOX).  The revenue generated by DOA 
testing was $1.6 billion in 2008 and was expected to grow to $2.5 billion by 2015, an annual growth rate 
of 8% (Frost & Sullivan, 2009). 
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Drug testing was widely promoted in the U.S. during the 1980’s by the Reagan administration as part of 
the escalating war on drugs and had become a common feature of both the employment environment and 
the criminal justice system. Drug testing was seen as an effective supervision tool in closely monitoring 
the behavior of offenders, one that could possibly deter future drug use and criminal behavior (Williams, 
2008).  A majority of probationers and parolees were required to undergo periodic drug testing as a 
condition of their status (Drug Policy Alliance, 2010). In response to this need, drugs of abuse testing had 
grown as an important supporting service to the criminal justice system nationally. 
 
Norchem was one of several smaller labs that served the criminal justice market.  In general, the large 
labs did not compete for this business.  Norchem’s direct competitors were Redwood Toxicology 
Laboratory, Inc., San Diego Reference Laboratory, Pacific Toxicology Laboratories, Forensic 
Laboratories, Inc. and Kroll. In 2010, Kroll was acquired by Redwood Toxicology’s parent company, 
Alere, a signal of the changing competitive landscape in which larger labs were acquiring specialized 
smaller labs to broaden their capabilities. 
In the late 2000s, the industry was experiencing significant competition on both price and value-added 
services.  Customers could specify testing for the presence of one to many drugs for each specimen. 
Typically a specimen in the past was a urine sample, but labs were beginning to test alternate matrices—
saliva, hair, and sweat.  When SPICE, a synthetic marijuana, was introduced on the streets, labs quickly 
developed tests for its presence.  Norchem was one of the first.  In addition, an increasing number of 
independent labs offered to interface with clients’ information systems providing data where and when it 
was needed.   
 
Until 2009, Norchem and the DOA testing industry in general had experienced significant growth.  
However, with the onset of the 2008-2009 recession, public funding for a wide variety of programs at 
state and local levels was reduced significantly (McNichol, Oliff, & Johnson, 2012). Police, prison, and 
social services of all kinds were squeezed as states’ tax revenues declined. DOA testing programs were 
not immune to these contractions, and the companies in the industry were affected. Norchem experienced 
its first year of decreased demand.  As described by Gibbs in December 2010: 
 
It was the very first year in our history that we actually didn't grow revenue—a shock to 
our system.  But it was kind of the nature of the really rotten economy. Most of the larger 
labs dropped 10 to 15%, they were in employment testing, and employment testing got 
smashed. 
 
We didn't lose big accounts but clients just shrunk their work down to nothing. You 
know—a client that was doing $17 grand a month dropped to $7000 a month.  The way 
they managed it was they changed their randomization routines. Instead of testing twice a 
week, they tested twice a month. Big impact on us…it still continues to some extent. We 
had to work really hard last year to fill in and we were successful at bringing in new 
customers. There were more small customers as opposed to big ones. 
 
In addition to the recession, there were trends reduced demand.  One trend was the increased use of point-
of-collection testing kits.  With these kits, clients performed the screening test in their own facility with 
immediate results and only sent a specimen to a lab if the presence of drugs was detected.  The lab then 
only performed a confirmatory test to determine what drug was present. Finally, the consolidation of 
some smaller labs into the three major labs had reduced demand for Norchem because some clients 
preferred to use a single large lab as a one-stop-shop. This also added significant downward price 
pressure due to the economies of scale of these large labs. 
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Certification 
All medical testing laboratories were governed by the 1988 Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) 
that was implemented in 1992 to establish quality standards that ensured accuracy, reliability, and 
timeliness of patient test results.   At the end of 2010, there were approximately 250,000 labs performing 
tests on humans (research labs were not included) that were regulated by The Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS). Laboratories, under CLIA accreditation were required to do proficiency testing 
of blind samples, and their facilities were inspected by CMS every two years in order to maintain 
certification (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2012). 
 
In addition to CLIA, forensic toxicology labs could opt to obtain the much more rigorous and specific 
Forensic Drug Testing accreditation from the College of American Pathologists (CAP). CAP was 
“designed to go well beyond regulatory compliance” to make sure the needs of employers and law 
enforcement were met (College of American Pathology, 2011). Accreditation involved adhering to four 
primary standards concerning the scientific director and personnel, the physical facilities, quality 
management of the laboratory testing and the chain of custody documentation processes, and finally the 
standard for inspections, proficiency testing protocols, and self-assessment required to maintain 
accreditation (College of American Pathology, 2009). 
 
Company History 
In 1994, William (Bill) P. Gibbs and Dr. Thomas E. Vorpahl, and the local hospital, Flagstaff Medical 
Center (FMC), co-owned Alliance Medical Laboratory, a medical testing lab. Frustrated with long 
payment intervals and the resulting cash flow difficulties caused by health insurance companies, Gibbs 
and Vorpahl thought it would be nice to have revenue that was not dependent on health insurance.  As 
they looked to diversify their income stream, they purchased a small, locally-owned toxicology lab, 
Northern Arizona Chemistry Lab (NACL), in Flagstaff, AZ. 
 
At the time of the purchase, NACL had two employees and was testing approximately 70 urine specimens 
per day for the presence of drugs of abuse.  NACL’s clients were the probation departments of several 
counties in northern Arizona.  Gibbs and Vorpahl moved the toxicology lab into Alliance’s facilities at 
FMC.  Initially, Alliance used immunoassay screening techniques followed by tests where color changes 
were observed on a chemically-treated paper strip to confirm the presence of drugs.  These confirmation 
tests were 95% accurate but Gibbs knew that they needed to invest in more advanced technologies. They 
quickly adopted gas chromatography and bought their first GC/MS machine.  Gibbs recalled:  
 
It was crazy in the beginning; we did all these collections here in town.  All of the 
Coconino probation officers came to our offices up at the hospital. We had a lady doing 
our collections in a small, little bathroom in the hallway. All my clinical staff and my 
accounting staff were sitting outside, right in front of the bathroom. 
 
Norchem Drug Testing was born in 1997 when Gibbs and Vorpahl spun off the toxicology lab from 
Alliance Medical Labs.  Alliance had received a takeover bid from LabCorp, a large, national medical 
testing laboratory, but the toxicology lab was not included in the offer.  At that point, it was necessary to 
move the toxicology lab out of the hospital, so Gibbs and Vorpahl rented a space on the east side of town 
and had a naming contest for the newly independent company. The name, Norchem, was revealed at the 
company Christmas party via a modified poster of the currently-popular movie, Speed. The poster 
featured Keanu Reeves and a flaming bus with the phrase “Get Ready for Rush Hour.” The movie title, 
Speed, was replaced by Norchem. 
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Joni was one of the original NACL employees and a credentialed medical technologist.  She also had a 
background in sales and marketing and she quickly reminded Gibbs and Vorpahl that her skills might be 
better employed in helping to grow the business. They took her up on her offer and were glad they did, 
because in a short time she was able to sign up two out-of-state customers. These clients were large for 
Norchem and doubled its sales.  Joni continued to be highly successful selling Norchem’s services and 
she moved the sales office to Denver in the early 2000s.  
 
In 2000, Norchem created a new position and hired its first Ph.D. Scientific Director.  With this hire came 
a focus on achieving relevant industry certifications and improving the technology of the process in order 
to increase the accuracy and reliability of its results.  As part of Alliance, the company had earned a CLIA 
certification.  Under the direction of the new Scientific Director, Norchem worked toward and obtained 
the CAP Forensic Drug Testing accreditation. 
 
As a result of both its high-quality product and customer service and the success of the sales team, 
Norchem experienced increasing sales growth every year until 2009 (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Norchem Sales Revenue 1995-2009 
Year Revenue Percent Change 
1995  $   465,793  - 
1996  $   539,875  16% 
1997  $1,016,795  88% 
1998  $1,285,119  26% 
1999  $1,573,433  22% 
2000  $1,650,549  5% 
2001  $2,253,563  37% 
2002  $3,477,778  54% 
2003  $4,318,051  24% 
2004  $5,158,395  19% 
2005  $5,534,130  7% 
2006  $6,237,244  13% 
2007  $7,955,035  28% 
2008  $9,635,865  21% 
2009  $8,762,692  -9% 
Average 28% 
 
Production Process 
The service that Norchem provided its clients was simple in concept but complex in the details. Norchem 
was contracted by its clients to provide drug test results. For example, a probation department monitored 
parolees that were required by a court to have regular drug tests as a condition of their parole. The 
probation department or a third-party provider would collect urine specimens from the parolees (donors). 
The specimens were then shipped to Norchem for analysis.  Norchem would perform the required 
analysis and provide test results (information) to the client. 
 
Norchem organized its production process into two major steps: specimen processing and analysis. In the 
first step, receipt of the specimen was recorded and the specimen was prepared for the requested tests. In 
analysis, all specimens were screened for the presence of drugs. Then, depending on the requirements of 
the client and the results of the screening, a confirmatory analysis might be performed. The complexity in 
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the process arose from the variety of requests received from the clients since they could request tests for 
approximately 40 different drugs and one specimen could be tested for any combination of these drugs.  
Complexity also arose from the fact that each drug had a different testing protocol—recipe for detecting a 
drug.  Finally, each specimen had different storage requirements depending on the client requirements and 
test results.     
 
The production facility started empty every morning.  Specimens were received by courier (75%) or 
Federal Express (25%).  Most specimens arrived early in the morning though a second shipment could be 
received mid-morning.  The number of specimens that arrived per day varied significantly and could be as 
many as 6500.  Typically, the average in 2008-2010 was 4500 specimens per day. 
 
When received from the client, the specimen and documentation were in a plastic bag. Some clients 
(40%) would have already entered the test requirements into the laboratory information system (LIS) and 
all that was required was that receipt of the specimen be acknowledged.  Other clients (60%) included a 
form with the specimen that specified the requested tests and the lab tech entered this information into the 
LIS.  Documentation was an important quality aspect provided by Norchem to its clients.  Some test 
results would be used in court and required stringent and verifiable documentation.  
 
Once the specimen was registered with the LIS, it was loaded into a robot that dispensed a small amount 
of the specimen, called an aliquot, into a test tube. This machine eliminated the need for a lab technician 
to manually open and pour some of each specimen into a test tube.  It is important to note that in the next 
process step, analysis, lab technicians worked with the sample in the test tube not the original specimen.  
The remainder of the specimen was stored temporarily. If the results were negative, the specimen was 
stored for 14 days in case the client needed to order additional tests. Specimens that were not negative 
were saved for one year and were available for retesting in the event of a court challenge.  
 
During screening, the first analysis step, most test tubes (95%) were loaded into the process bottleneck, an 
analyzer (AU2700) that performed chemistry-immunoassay and other screening tests for the presence of 
drugs. Each sample was tested for the presence of one or more drug families—for example, opiates. 
Positive test results could only conclude that there was a presence of some type of opiate in the urine.  
This test was generally adequate for monitoring parolees but was not adequate if the results were required 
as evidence in court. The screening test was faster and less expensive than the more detailed, 
confirmatory test that could detect the presence of a specific drug. 
 
The AU2700, a $200,000-$250,000 machine, used a batch size of 30 test tubes.  The process time for a 
batch varied from a 10 to 20 minutes depending on the tests that had been requested for that particular 
batch of specimens.  There were four of these machines and the challenge came from trying to run this 
bottleneck efficiently while managing the upstream and downstream processes well.  The process needed 
to be “synchronized; like a dance” as described by Mark Mayrand, Norchem’s operations manager.  
 
As required by CAP, the forensic drug testing certification rules, Norchem was required to run quality 
tests on control samples to check that the analyzer was correctly calibrated and accurately running the 
tests.  In fact, each batch of client test tubes had to be both preceded and followed by a complete batch of 
control samples. This represented a substantial portion of the time to process a batch and significantly 
affected the throughput of the analyzer. 
 
Once the screening was completed, a technician sorted the original donor specimens for further 
processing.  At this division point in the process there were many directions that the specimen could 
travel.  If no drugs were detected (80%), processing was completed on the specimen, the customer 
notified of the results, and the specimen was stored for 14 days. If drugs were detected, processing might 
be completed and reported or the customer could require confirmation testing. 
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Confirmation testing was the second step in analysis.  If a sample was determined to be positive during 
the screening step and if the client had requested, the specimen flowed through the more expensive and 
time consuming confirmatory testing.  Based on the screening results, a lab tech created a new sample 
from the original specimen.  In general, the confirmatory process steps were: create a sample with the 
correct dilution, add reagents, incubate (if required), extract the drug from the sample and concentrate it, 
and perform mass spectrometry. The mass spectrum analysis process time depended on the drug and 
required from 30-90 minutes for a batch of 12 samples before a scientist read the data analysis, interpreted 
the results, and submitted the results to the LIS. The batch size depended on the type of drug test but 10-
12 was typical. Approximately 600 samples per day were processed in confirmatory testing, 50 per day 
were samples that were brought out of storage per customer request for additional testing. 
 
Since each specimen that came into the lab was processed to the customer’s requirement, the lab was 
highly customized and functioned much like a job-shop process.  Each sample flowed through and exited 
the process uniquely depending upon the requests and the results. The product, a report sent to the client, 
could be generated at screening or after one or more confirmatory tests.   
 
The Lean Journey 
The Lean Journey Begins 
Despite improvements in process technology and sales successes, Norchem was faced with a challenge in 
the early 2000s.  Competitors were reducing prices and Norchem was feeling pressure to respond.  
However, competitors’ prices were approaching Norchem’s costs.  Gibbs described the situation:  
 
Why did we go to lean?  The company was on the verge of disaster. Margins were falling 
like a bowling ball off a cliff. Competitors were cutting us by 30%. When we first began, 
we were getting $15 per test, and at the beginning of lean, only $6.50. Without lean we’d 
have been heading for the trash can. It was survival mode. 
 
During this time, Gibbs read some articles in the business press about Jack Welch, CEO of General 
Electric, and became interested in Six Sigma.  One of the developers of Six Sigma, Mikel Harry, had his 
Six Sigma Management Institute in Phoenix, Arizona. Gibbs and his wife, Rebecca, a medical 
technologist and Norchem’s Quality Assurance Officer, decided to attend a Six Sigma workshop at the 
institute.   Gibbs recalled:  
 
It was kind of an afterthought almost; it was the last day of the program and the facilitator 
talked about lean and how it was this commonsense approach to removing waste from 
processes, being able to identify wastes.  He talked about the seven forms of muda 
[waste] and I thought, “Aha, this makes sense to me. This is easy and I can do this.” So I 
got all fired up about that and I started buying books and bought Womack's books and 
there were references in this program.  I probably spent six months just reading all the 
books. I was pumped, all fired up and excited, and I realized this is what I needed to do. 
 
So I went into the lab and it was obvious to me, all this muda.  Oh, I was a tornado!  I 
told everyone we were doing it wrong and I redesigned the process and I sat down with 
my senior people. “Okay here's what we’re going to do, when we're going to do it, and 
it's all going to work, and it's not going to be that bad.” Of course, it's never that easy but 
we did it anyway, and it was tougher than the dickens on our staff. I can remember some 
of my people working 16-hour days for a month with no days off. It was crazy! It was so 
disruptive the way I did it. I regret it to this day. Most of those people are no longer with 
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the company, unfortunately.  There are some survivors, and the survivors today are the 
new leaders that endured this difficulty, and I think that they are much better tuned to 
how to make changes and to avoid this trauma that change can be. So, we learned a lot in 
that process but when the day was done we got all the benefits. It was real and it affirmed 
to me certainly that the path we were on was the right path. 
 
One of the people that survived was Chris Stephens who became the Material Control Group Leader.  He 
described the changes:  
 
The first thing that most people would say is that it is rewarding. But if you go back to 
where you were when you started you can say that it is very hard. You have to break out 
of a mindset. Once you get used to something you get comfortable. And once you get 
comfortable it is so hard to undo what you are doing. 
 
Stephens concluded that they often had to try changes that didn’t work before they developed a change 
that improved things. 
 
The Lean Journey Continues 
One the most controversial of the changes was that lab technicians’ chairs were removed and they were 
expected to stand while working.  Some technicians actually quit because of this change and those that 
stayed complained about back and feet problems so much that Gibbs brought in an ergonomics expert. 
The expert applauded the elimination of the chairs and said it was much healthier to stand, especially 
since people often slouched unhealthily in chairs.  The expert was concerned about other aspects of the 
technicians’ jobs when a single motion was required repeatedly without interruption. Norchem learned 
how to change the processes to eliminate these potentially-harmful, repetitive motions.   
 
By 2005, the benefits of lean were clear and Gibbs intended for Norchem to continue the lean journey.  
However, it was time for Gibbs to get out of the lab—some in the lab were even telling him so—and as 
CEO, he had plenty competing for his time.  Ricardo Castillo, an industrial engineer with lean experience, 
was hired as the Lean Manager.  His full-time responsibilities were to continuously improve Norchem’s 
processes. 
 
One of Castillo’s first steps was to map Norchem’s value streams and to identify and understand the 
internal and external customers of each value stream.  In addition, Castillo continued the work begun 
when the chairs were eliminated by implementing standardized work for all processes in the lab. The 
work was visually documented and all work stations were 5S’d. 
 
At first, the technicians responded to Castillo’s presence in the lab with uncertainty.  As Gibbs described:    
 
Ricardo was persona non grata when he walked into the lab.  They didn’t want this guy 
hovering around with a stopwatch and clipboard. They thought he was like checking 
them out or something. Soon, they realized he was there to help them, to improve their 
lives, to make it easier, and to take away these wasteful steps. So he became a quick 
collaborator and they are not bothered by it now.  
 
Transparency was an aspect of several other changes. Improvement projects were documented before and 
after with A3 reports that were posted in a hallway for all to see.  Employee suggestions were also 
encouraged, rewarded, and implemented quickly. They were posted on a board in a hallway next to the 
entrance to the lab. Gibbs and Castillo began hoshin planning which also increased transparency in the 
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organization. Goals and performance measurements identified in the hoshin planning were posted. 
Gradually, a culture that embraced, or at least expected, change began to grow. 
 
The benefits of applying lean in the lab continued to accrue.  Increased volume was processed by fewer 
lab technicians using less floor space.  With such significant improvement in the lab, Gibbs admitted a 
concern:  
 
My great fear now is we will backslide; that we will get complacent or we will get really 
busy and all of a sudden being busy is more important than changing. And I know that 
would be our death if we go down that road. So I keep agitating Ricardo and pestering 
him and poking at him and asking him what are we doing about this and what are we 
doing about that.  So he has to go in the lab and say “What are we doing about this? And 
what are we doing about that?”… But it lets everyone know we are still on the road here. 
 
Diffusing Lean Thinking Throughout the Company 
Having achieved successes in the lab, Gibbs and Castillo sought to spread lean thinking more broadly. 
Amanda Gibbs, manager of the accounting/finance area, when hired in March 2008 had been tasked with 
implementing lean accounting. There are two dimensions to lean accounting. First, implementing metrics 
and reporting systems that are capable of measuring lean improvements in the manufacturing area—for 
Norchem—the lab.  Second, applying lean concepts to the processes that occur in the accounting/finance 
area. Norchem had already started working on the first and wanted to start working on the second. 
 
Amanda had several projects in addition to applying lean thinking to accounting.  First, the department 
needed to implement a new accounting software package, as Norchem had outgrown the current one.  She 
also wanted to automate some processes. However, her staff had no time to allocate to improvement 
projects as they were fully occupied with routine tasks.   
 
If she could free up some staff time for an improvement project, one place she wanted to start was with 
certifying vendors. As recommended in lean thinking, this would allow some invoice and payment 
processes to be automated, thereby saving staff time. In order to certify a vendor, an understanding of the 
needs of both the vendor and Norchem had to be developed.  As Amanda described: 
 
The idea with the certified vendor is to work out all of the nitty-gritty details to the point 
where we wouldn’t even get invoices from the vendor.  And then, we would pay based on 
a receiving document rather than actually getting an invoice. But there is a lot of work 
before we can get to that point.  What are all of those details that we have to work out 
with the vendor?   
 
Obviously, we have to agree on prices, we have to agree on when we pay the vendor.  
How are we going to reference it? If they are not sending us an invoice anymore I’m not 
going to be able to reference an invoice number on the payment that they receive.  We 
would just be prompted for payment as long as it was received how it was ordered. What 
are the shipping details and how often will they deliver to us?   
 
At the time, Norchem had pricing agreements with some of its large vendors, which was a start in the 
certification process. However, before Amanda’s department staff could move any of these projects 
forward, she needed to free up some of her people’s time. She knew that transaction processing, whether 
it was accounts receivable, accounts payable, or general ledger transactions, needed to be reviewed and 
redesigned so that it was operating more efficiently and incorporated lean thinking. Amanda described:  
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The accounting area, for the most part, is a non-value added activity in the lean sense.  
We are trying to figure out how we can process the most work with the fewest people.  
Our overall goal is to get cash faster from our customers and then to pay our vendors in 
the most efficient way possible. 
 
A challenge in applying lean with experienced, knowledge workers is that if they hear, “We want to help 
you do a good job,” some take it to mean, “You are doing a bad job now.” Despite the fact that the lab 
had been implementing lean for several years and the employees in accounting/finance had experienced 
lean training, bringing lean into the accounting/finance area was traumatic.  The staff felt that they were 
already doing a good job—efficient with no work-in-process (WIP). As Ricardo was documenting the 
process, he asked one of the staff why she was stacking some paperwork off to the side, incomplete.  She 
replied that she needed to get back to it later as it needed different handling.  Ricardo said, “That’s WIP.”  
The staff person replied, “Ohhh! That’s what you’ve been talking about.” Before the implementations 
were completed, there were many tense conversations, some even with tears, and one employee had quit. 
 
So transaction processing was redesigned and streamlined into a transaction cell.  Traditionally, accounts 
receivable (AR) and accounts payable (AP) processes were handled by different people, but Amanda was 
dividing the work differently.  Each transaction was first prepped by a staff member whether it was AR or 
AP or general ledger.  This staff member placed the prepped transaction into a heijunka box by priority.  
The heijunka box gave the manager a visual cue when AR/AP was falling behind so she could balance the 
workload.  A second staff member performed the entry of the transaction.  Amanda said that as she was 
redesigning the processes and talking to other accounting people, she could see the red flags being raised.   
She continued: 
 
I am essentially taking away the segregation of duties between AR and AP.  And 
everybody is like “Oh, my gosh! You can’t do that.”  When we started planning this 
process, I gave everybody the mandate of “don’t think about controls at this point, we 
just want to design the most efficient process we can.” Once we design the process, we’ll 
take a step back and look at what our risks are from an internal control standpoint and 
figure out what controls we need to mitigate those risks.  I don’t want to design a process 
that is mandated by internal controls. I want to design a process and then figure out what 
controls we need in place.  
 
Amanda worked with the controller and consulted with the AR/AP staff to redesign the process. As 
Amanda described: 
 
When you are redefining the entire process you really want a higher-level person to do it. 
The people in the trenches don’t necessarily have a high-level view.  The AR/AP staff did 
not like that we were coming up with the processes. There was a lot of resistance 
because, “That’s not how I do it.” “Well, I realize that’s not the way you do it, but we are 
going to try it under this new standard process for a while and see how it works.”  
 
Once the controller and I started rolling that out with AR/AP staff, there were things that 
we missed—little details. We needed to get that detail back into the standard work 
documentation and they were able to help us out a lot.  But it was really doing 
observations, not getting too caught up in the way we do it now but looking at it from an 
overall theoretical perspective. How should the flow be? What’s the ideal? But still 
wanting to understand what they do now, so we don’t leave out important details. 
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As Amanda was designing the transaction cell, she was concerned about additional challenges: 
 
The other thing that’s hard in our area is the demand for work is so variable from day to 
day.  One day we get one check and one invoice in the mail and another day we will get a 
large stack.  So it just depends. 
 
The demand was not level and was often exacerbated by erratic U.S. postal deliveries.   
 
Amanda described another anticipated challenge—exceptions to the standardized work in the transaction 
cell. Amanda knew that she had not captured all transactions in the standardized work and that there 
would be a transition period. These exceptions had to be handled but had not been included because they 
were too infrequent and unusual.  In anticipation of these exceptions, Amanda created a ‘do-later’ box for 
the prep person to place work that was out of the ordinary. Similarly, for the entry side of the transaction 
cell, if the person had no idea how to enter a transaction they were to place it in the ‘oops box.’ Amanda 
then monitored the contents of these boxes, transactions that had to be handled separately, and tried to 
figure out how to process them in the future without special handling. 
 
Finally, Amanda wondered about identifying errors.  Once identified, what errors could be prevented by 
modifying the standardized work and which would have to be corrected? A challenge to identifying the 
errors is that they might not be found until the end of the month, which was not very timely. So her 
challenge was to figure out how to capture that data as soon as possible.  
 
While some aspects continued to evolve, the lean accomplishments in the AR/AP processes included 
standardized work, visual documentation, and the heijunka box. Later, a temporary employee came to fill 
in and said that this was the easiest place to learn the company’s processes that she had worked.   
 
Supplier Relationships 
Norchem had made significant improvements by applying lean thinking in the lab, accounting/finance, 
and human resources.  However, a challenging theme began to emerge in several improvement projects.  
Many of Norchem’s processes did not start or end within its four walls. For example, the testing process 
could actually be considered to start at the client’s facility when the initial specimen was collected.  
Likewise, many processes relied on equipment or supplies from vendors. To improve these processes, 
Norchem needed to understand the interface between its processes and the vendors’. Any improvement at 
the interface required Norchem to solicit cooperation from vendors to reduce waste. 
 
This represents an aspect of applying lean thinking in a small business that is different from larger 
companies like Toyota, Honda, and Boeing.  The principles are the same: determine what adds value for 
your customers and remove waste from the system.   However, as Amanda pointed out, “Unfortunately 
we’re not as big as a Toyota that can just kinda say, ‘This is the way we do it now.’” Castillo added, 
“Even though some vendors are 20 times bigger in revenue or size, Bill’s still trying to convince them, 
‘Hey, you gotta be lean, so I can be more lean.’” Gibbs expanded: 
 
You know, I think the whole supply chain question is one of the tougher parts of being a 
small lean shop surrounded by other companies that are in certain stages of their journey. 
Those that know nothing I send them a book, trying to get them excited about lean. 
 
Location was another difference. Amanda had been reading about lean supplier relationships that 
included the supplier monitoring the client’s inventory, stocking it when needed, and the client 
paying based on its usage rate. Amanda wondered how that could possibly work for Norchem 
given that none of its suppliers were nearby.  
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Seeking Supplier Support for One-Piece Flow 
One-piece flow is an ideal of lean operations. As Mark Mayrand, operations manager, described, “Any 
type of batching is considered muda, even though it might provide benefits in other areas of your 
operations.”  At Norchem, much of the batching was driven by the sophisticated testing equipment. The 
immunoassay analyzer worked in batches of 30. The aliquot machines in specimen processing also 
worked in batches of 30.  These aliquot machines were purchased in 2005. Before that time, Norchem had 
been processing the specimens by hand.  Gibbs had wanted to automate this process and began exploring 
the possibility of acquiring machines from U. S. Plastics (USP). USP was a supplier of the collection kits 
Norchem sent to its clients and other plastic supplies needed in the lab.  USP also sold aliquot machines 
and was willing to finance the purchase of these machines provided Norchem would purchase the 
collection kits from them during the finance agreement period, which would last about five years. Under 
this agreement, there would be a machine service fee and a machine cost on every collection kit 
purchased.  USP was not primarily in business to sell the machines but as Mayrand explained:  
 
What they want to do is just get their money back on their equipment. But they really 
want to tie you into a long-term relationship on buying their plastic. And the way they do 
that is they are willing to finance those machines as long as you are paying the 
percentage, but they are really making the money on the sale of their plastic. And you 
can’t go anywhere…  
 
Norchem agreed to purchase two aliquot machines from USP and that tied them into a five-year 
agreement to purchase USP plastic.  
   
As Norchem moved further in their lean journey, Gibbs and Castillo realized that the batch size required 
by the aliquot machines was preventing them from reducing WIP.  In order to move specimen processing 
toward one-piece flow, Norchem ultimately needed an automated piece of equipment that worked with a 
batch size of one. Further, as the end of the contract was approaching, Norchem was having increasing 
difficulty with the reliability of the USP aliquot machines.  The summer before the contract expired, the 
machines frequently broke down. 
   
In addition, there was the introduction of a leak-proof specimen vial, an innovation that USP developed 
that had the potential to reduce costs.  With the old vials, a specimen might leak. The shippers wanted any 
leakage contained so a specimen had double protection, the lab package and a box or bag similar to a 
biohazard package.  USP’s leak-proof specimen vials allowed the second level of packaging to be 
omitted, saving Norchem 45 cents on each specimen from the client.  Ironically, the USP aliquot 
machines could not reliably open these new ones. The machines only worked well with old-style USP 
containers. Additionally, they could not open containers from other suppliers.  This was a problem 
because sometimes Norchem received vials from clients that Norchem had not supplied.  Each day there 
were more that had to be processed as exceptions, which was time consuming and could quickly offset the 
packaging cost savings. 
 
This was not the first time that USP had changed the collection vials without informing Norchem. As 
Stephens described: 
 
They’ve changed resins, to save money and not make us pay more as a customer, and 
every time they did that, there were problems. There were also design changes, actually, 
quite a few times.   
 
The operations manager, Mayrand, added that suppliers would make changes in a product in 
order “to save a dime or nickel or even half a cent” and the repercussion to Norchem could be 
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significant.  The “poor techs on the line have to live with trying to make it work.”  Norchem 
would learn about the changes after the fact because there would be problems at the aliquot 
machine or a client would complain about leakage. 
 
Due to the quality issues with the machines, the history of variation in the plastics, and its idealized goal 
of one piece flow for specimen processing, Norchem started to explore other options for the aliquot 
machines.  First they approached USP asking if it had a machine that worked with smaller batches or if it 
would be interested in developing such a machine.  The supplier did not currently have such a machine in 
its product portfolio but was willing to explore the market potential.  Unfortunately, they found no 
interest in the market and were not interested in pursuing the idea further. 
 
Gibbs explained why other companies were not interested in a single-piece flow machine: 
 
It's counterintuitive to build a machine that requires a person to touch it with every 
sample and other testing labs are thinking, “Why would I spend 80,000 bucks to build an 
aliquot device that only takes care of one person?  That doesn't make sense, does it?” You 
want a big, giant robot that does a bazillion things with 100 people feeding it. That's not 
lean, that violates all of the lean concepts. Lean concepts say single piece flow, man-size 
machines that maintain a pace with the person's productivity.   
 
Not to be discouraged from its goal of one-piece flow, Norchem worked with local engineers to design 
and build the machine that it envisioned.  This gave Norchem a unique opportunity to affect the design of 
the aliquot machine.  Much of what it learned during the five years using the USP machines and 
implementing lean thinking went into the specifications and requirements for the new machine.  
Flexibility and the ability to handle variation was a priority. As Mayrand explained, the more lean the 
processes, the more problems due to variability were exposed.  In particular, due to their experience with 
USP’s machines, Mayrand had the engineers design the Mini-Merit opener to account for all the 
variability that might be expected in a vial lid regardless of the supplier—a universal opener (analogous to 
a universal remote).  
 
Initially, a single machine, the Mini-Merit, was built and the efficacy of the design was tested. Pleased 
with its experience with the new machine, Norchem ordered three more Mini-Merits to replace the USP 
machines.  After installing the four machines, the current state of the value stream map for specimen 
processing was revised.  Norchem found significant improvements on several dimensions: the percent of 
value-added time was increased from 25% to 97%, the downstream process was loaded earlier in the day, 
which improved the first hour of production by 28%, and required floor space for the process was reduced 
by 26%. Gibbs explained their lean thinking: 
 
So we work really, really hard to make the upstream activities as efficient as we can, 
where they can go at the same rate of speed as our bottleneck, our very expensive 
analyzer [AU2700]. You have this quarter of a million dollar investment sitting there.  
You want to make sure that the analyzer has every opportunity to meet its performance 
specifications. You have to devote yourself to that. If you devote yourself upstream of 
that or downstream of that and it doesn't support 100% of its performance metrics then 
you are wasting money. We balanced very carefully to that bottleneck and now we are 
able to feed the machine with one individual. That's kind of unusual. Most labs need 
more than one person to feed the immunoassay analyzer. But we’ve been able to engineer 
that process upstream so that one individual given this robot, this man-size robot, can 
feed that bottleneck constraint. 
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Another Challenge with Plastic Supplies 
So while Mayrand anticipated variation in the vial lids and specified the universal opener, there were 
other unanticipated variations. One of the supplies was a plastic tip that was used by the aliquot machine 
to pipette some of the specimen from the vial and place it in a test tube.  To prevent cross-contamination, 
the tip had to be changed for every specimen.  Norchem continued to use the USP supplied tips when it 
switched from the USP machines to the Mini-Merits. During that summer when Norchem first tested the 
Mini-Merit, USP, without advising Norchem started providing a competitor’s tip instead of its own tip. 
Mayrand surmised that USP was moving production during this time, so USP was unable to produce the 
product. Norchem used what was sent and the competitor’s tips worked fine on both the USP machines 
and the newly installed, experimental Mini-Merit.  In the fall, the rest of the Mini-Merits were installed 
and all of the USP machines were decommissioned.  Then, again, without communication, USP changed 
the tips, no longer shipping the competitor’s tips but USP’s own again.  At this point, Norchem began 
having problems. The Mini-Merit would pick up a new tip but sometimes wouldn’t detect it, so it would 
pick up a second tip.  With two tips fitted, the aliquot could not be performed until an operator manually 
pulled off the extra tip, re-homed the machine, and restarted the process.  This would happen 3-4 times 
per 100 tip changes.  Since a tip change must happen with each specimen, this significantly slowed 
production and frustrated the operators. 
 
Mayrand called the USP sales representative and his response was to blame the new machines.  Mayrand 
requested to go back to the competitor’s tips that USP had been shipping for about six months, but the 
sales representative said that could not be done. More investigation showed that some of the dimensions 
of the tips had changed. The sales representative was more responsive when Mayrand presented these 
details and the rep suggested that Norchem contact the process engineer.  Mayrand tried to reach the 
process engineer but was unable to connect with him for two months. USP had been acquired and there 
had been a lot of movement and assimilation of the USP staff that Norchem had been working with. 
Meanwhile, since Norchem no longer had to purchase the tips from USP, it contacted the competitor 
whose tips had been working well with the new machines.  Norchem entered into a one-year contract to 
purchase the tips, though at a 50% cost increase.  Mayrand summarized his frustration in working with 
the newly-acquired USP. 
 
And so that’s probably the best indication.  I mean how do you deal in this maze if you 
are trying to be lean and if you don’t have piles of inventory?   How can you run when 
you have a vendor that essentially says, “I can’t help you” for two months? 
 
Go to the Gemba 
Not all aspects of Norchem’s relationship with USP had been as frustrating.  Another supplier 
relationship issue concerned the collection kits supplied by USP. The collection kits arrived at Norchem’s 
dock on pallets.  The collection kits were boxed in quantities of 100. There were two types of kits: female 
and male.  The 100-kit boxes were stacked on pallets and shrink wrapped. Norchem had been receiving 
damaged collection kit boxes.  If the boxes were seriously damaged, the tamper resistant packaging could 
be broken and the vials could even be crushed.  USP had been using R+L Carriers and then switched to 
FedEx Direct with a resulting temporary improvement.  However, the number of damaged boxes 
increased again to where Norchem received 5-10 damaged 100-kit boxes on a pallet of 45 boxes.  Some 
of the pallets of the female-kit boxes were damaged around the entire perimeter of the pallet which meant 
that half the boxes were damaged and the other half had to be repackaged into 100s or sent in smaller 
quantities only for the ‘call-in’ orders.  This required a significant repackaging effort so that the boxes of 
100 were complete with no damaged kits.  Shipping collection kits was requiring a full day of staff time 
each week. 
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Stephens, the Material Control Group Leader, decided to ‘go to the gemba.’ That is, he decided to visit 
USP where the work was being performed.  When Stephens visited, he watched the pallets of kits being 
built and shrink wrapped and loaded onto the truck.  He noticed that since the female boxes were larger, 
when 45 boxes (3x3x5) were placed on the pallets, the boxes overhung the pallet. This made the boxes 
more vulnerable to damage when they were being loaded and during transport. Stephens requested that 
instead of placing 4500 kits on a pallet that only 3000 kits be loaded (3x2x5).  That way the boxes did not 
overhang the pallet.  He also observed that for another customer, USP used corner protectors on each of 
the pallets to protect the box corners.  The supplier would shrink wrap one layer, place a guard on each 
corner and then shrink wrap another layer. Stephens requested that these be used on Norchem’s 
shipments.  Norchem was very happy with the reduced number of damaged collection kits that resulted 
from the supplier’s positive response to Stephens’ advocacy. In addition, staff time to handle and re-ship 
the collection kits was reduced so that 70% of their collection kit fulfillment could be completed in thirty 
minutes. Stephens found that the visit to USP was worthwhile. He met the people he had been working 
with and found them more responsive after his visit.  
 
Quest for Just-in-time Shipment 
On a day that a shipment of collection kits was received, Norchem’s small dock would be filled with 
pallets, sometimes enough collection kits for over a week.  This concerned Gibbs and Castillo.  One of the 
most recognized dimensions of lean operations was just-in-time (JIT) inventory policies, ordering and 
receiving in small quantities what is needed when it’s needed. The collection kits were one of the largest 
components of Norchem’s inventory.  To reduce its collection kits inventory, Norchem would have to 
modify the ordering/shipping arrangements.  This meant collaboration with the supplier, USP, again.   
 
The current state. The current order unit was a complete pallet of either all female or all male kits. After 
the palletizing was improved, there were 30 boxes of 100 female kits on a pallet or 45 boxes of 100 male 
kits on a pallet. USP, located about 1700 miles away, paid for shipping. Typically, it shipped 12,000 
collection kits (one female pallet and two male pallets) every 2-3 days. However, there had been as many 
as 3 female and 4 male pallets on the dock, 27,000 kits, a six day supply.   
 
Norchem sent these kits to their clients on a regular basis to replace kits that had been shipped to 
Norchem with specimens to be tested.  Whenever a collection kit from a client was received and scanned 
as it entered the lab for a test, the shipping system made a note to replace it, much like a POS system in a 
retail store.  When the client needed 100 kits, a shipment was made.  Before shipping the new kits to the 
client, Norchem placed chain of custody forms (one for each kit) in the 100-kit box.  The chain of custody 
form had information about the client and was unique to that collection kit.  This inventory was an 
unusual type of inventory. It was owned by Norchem but sent to clients without payment.  The kit cost 
was included in the charge for the test and could not be known until the client shipped the collection kit to 
Norchem for testing. 
 
Norchem occasionally ran out of collection kits and could not send kits to clients until the next shipment 
arrived from USP. Gibbs and Castillo thought that more frequent, smaller shipments would create a 
smoother flow and reduce the number of stock outs. If Norchem’s clients ran out of collection kits, the 
ramifications varied.  For some clients, it was an inconvenience to ask donors to come another time to 
provide the urine sample and this was not quality service.  For other clients it was more serious as they 
had probationers that were on a court-ordered testing schedule. 
 
Information lead time. An additional challenge of the current situation was the information lead time 
that Stephens, the Material Control Group Leader, had to consider. Many clients and suppliers were in 
different time zones than Norchem.  Stephens worked directly with the clients and “When they want 
something, it’s not like ‘hey, go ahead and take your time.’ It’s, ‘I need this now! I need this within a 
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week.’” The supplier, USP, was an hour ahead of Norchem.  Some clients were in California, an hour 
behind Norchem. If Stephens received a call from a California client near the end of the client’s day it 
was too late to get a shipment from USP. So, Stephens’ solution was to maintain some limited inventory 
at Norchem which allowed him to respond immediately to the client. It was even worse when it used a 
supplier in North Carolina.  Stephens described: 
 
They were three hours ahead of us most of the year; for a few months just two ahead of 
us, and when I needed them to do something, anything that was overnight, I couldn’t do 
it. So that’s why we brought it in-house. You know, we have the information lead time 
between us.  Every time they did something wrong, I had to wait to the next day. So 
bringing it in house, if there’s a problem and our client calls me, I walk back and talk to 
whoever my tech is at the time and say ‘Hey, can you ship this please.’ Done. Really, if 
you think about it, I have my inventory in house, I have my inventory on the way, and I 
have my inventory that hasn’t shipped that’s being ordered. And that’s all part of the 
calculation of how much inventory, total inventory that I have to have. 
 
The future state. Norchem wanted a just-in-time (JIT) supply shipping arrangement with USP.  As Gibbs 
described:  
 
So I think that that’s probably an area that I'm always interested in, how they could 
supply us on a just-in-time basis.  ‘Cause any inventory that they hold until I’m ready for 
it is money off my balance sheet.  So I like that.  
 
Within Norchem, there was not a clear consensus about the details of a JIT shipping arrangement. Gibbs 
and Castillo would like to have a shipment every day.  However, the purchasing manager did not want a 
daily shipment since a shipment every day would be smaller than a pallet, the current order unit.  If 
shipped every day then mixed pallets would arrive, requiring more time from Norchem’s packager. A 
further complication to daily just-in-time shipments was the uncertainty of Flagstaff weather. Unlike the 
stereotypic desert climate touted in Arizona travel brochures, Flagstaff is at an altitude of 7,000 feet, and 
receives an average of 100 inches of snow each year. Norchem was located on Interstate 40 and nearly 
every winter, I-40 closed due to weather conditions and a shipment might not get through.  If they were 
relying on this shipment and it was delayed a day or two, it would be problematic.    
 
Drop shipping the collection kits directly to the clients from a plastic supplier would eliminate having to 
ship them to Norchem’s inventory and then to its clients.  At one time, a supplier did ship directly to the 
client but that did not work well for several reasons.  First, Norchem’s competitive advantage was 
customer responsiveness but the supplier’s business model was built on low cost.  The supplier did not 
have the skills and processes in place to manage Norchem’s clients in the responsive manner that 
Norchem needed.  Stephens anticipated that asking USP to drop ship would be problematic for the same 
reasons. As Stephens explained: 
  
USP knows nothing about our clients; absolutely nothing. They want to ship you cases of 
stuff and that is it. They want to make the cheapest, but good quality, plastic possible. 
When I went there, they were producing this stuff non-stop, 24/7/365 days a year.  They 
have such a large operation, I think that it dissolves a lot of those costs so that they are 
one of the cheapest in the US. But on the client side, they don’t know what to do. They 
don’t know where to send, how many to send, you know, all that stuff.  
 
In addition, since Norchem added a chain of custody form to each collection kit, the supplier would need 
more information about each of Norchem’s clients. If the relationship was more collaborative this might 
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be appropriate.  However, since the supplier was not organized to provide customer responsiveness there 
were risks in sharing all of this information, especially confidential information like for those clients 
involved with the courts.  So there was not a clear consensus at Norchem on a realistic target condition to 
reduce collection kit inventory. Though Gibbs was clear on his ideal state, an implementation that 
reduced inventory without adding muda in other places so far had eluded his team. 
 
Continuing Challenge 
Norchem started on its lean journey because competitors’ prices for tests had dropped significantly and 
Gibbs realized that he had to reduce costs in order to continue to compete, even though it had built its 
client base on customer responsiveness.  As Gibbs described Norchem’s position:  
 
We are never going to beat pricing from these giants that are running 30,000-40,000 
samples per day. Their economies of scale are huge so they are going to be hard to beat 
on price. We have to do at least one of the principle competitive three things: quality, 
turnaround time, cost. Quality is pretty much a standard in our industry because we have 
these regulators so we're all held to an equal requirement. We have been extremely 
competitive with speed because we have focused on it.  We really put a lot of work into 
getting it back to the client very quickly.  Today we can process work faster than any lab 
in the country, 80% of our confirmation testing is out the same day that we receive the 
sample. Most labs if they have 25%, they're doing great. 
 
Also we are committed to flexibility in customizing things for them. We do a lot of work 
on information systems. We’ll build a custom interface to their program, so that their 
program now can reach out to our program and get the information it needs and populate 
that for their users. We will place employees in their facilities to do collections; we’ll set 
up collection sites outside their facilities with our staff or with contract staff to do 
collections. We’ll put specialized couriers on the road to pick up samples at oddball 
times. We do a lot of specialization.  
 
Mayrand emphasized this from a customer responsiveness perspective:  
 
So lean is hugely important from Gibbs’ point of view in making the place successful. 
When I look at our business model, I see a customer intimate organization that provides it 
the way the clients want it. And we are willing to modify things all along the chain, all 
along the value stream to give them what they want. 
 
So a combination of customer responsiveness and applying lean thinking had helped Norchem compete 
effectively in a niche where customers valued responsiveness, flexibility, and speed.  Lean had been 
particularly significant in reducing turnaround time and cost.  However, the industry continued to shift.  
Larger labs had stepped into Norchem’s market niche by acquiring some smaller labs and increased use of 
point-of-collection test kits had reduced demand for initial screenings.   Would customer responsiveness 
continue to be a competitive advantage? 
 
Stephens summarized the dilemma well: 
 
We deem ourselves an operationally excellent company because we can produce that real 
low cost unit. But I think Mayrand is right.  It is really hard to say. What do you put your 
money into? You know, where are you trying to get the ROI?  Is it the client, because you 
are willing to do whatever they want?  Or are you trying to get clients because you can 
sell them a really cheap product like a Wal-Mart?  
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